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DYNAMIC FEDERALISM AND THE CONCEPT
OF PREEMPTION
HARROP A. FREEMAN*
OME NOTION of preemption1 is inherent in the concept of a
federal system. Alexander Hamilton, the recognized spokesman
for a potent national government, considered this to be axi-
omatic.2 What is so simple and fundamental in theory, however, is
extremely difficult to put into practice. James Madison placed this
issue among the most difficult problems confronted by the drafters
of the Constitution.3
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1929, L.L.B. 1930, S.J.D. 1945,
Cornell University. Professor Freeman wishes to recognize the immeasurable con-
tribution of Douglas K. Smith, Cornell Law 1972, in his suggestions and annotations.
1. No definition of the word "preemption" will be attempted here. In English
law, preemption was the right of the Crown to purchase its necessaries before all
others. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 287. The term in this country origi-
nally referred to the right of a settler on government land to purchase it at a
fixed price in preference to all others. Nix v. Allen, 112 U.S. 129 (1884); cf.,
HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 127, 175 (1970). This writer
has used the term previously in reference to the right of the citizen to obey the
commands of his conscience in preference to those of the state. See, Freeman,
Moral Preemption Part 1: Tile Case for the Disobedient, Symposium on Preemp-
tion, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 425 (1966). Today the word is used to describe the legal
effect of the federal government's power to exclude a state from an area of legis-
lation, or the constitutional impotency of the states to intrude into an area of
legislation.
2. "If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be
the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter
into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the
powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those
societies and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a
mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government,
which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. ...
Hence we perceive that the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of
the Union . . . only declares a truth which flows immediately and necessarily from
the institution of a federal government." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204-05 (Men-
tor Book ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
3. "Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important
one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government
with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form. . ..
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition
between the authority of the general and that of the State governments." THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 26-227 (Mentor Book ed. 1961).
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Today, as the emphasis in government shifts to the international
scene and even internal matters take on a national rather than lo-
cal dimension, the need to understand and define the basic concept
of federalism becomes paramount. A dynamic federalism would
seem to be demanded. Where to draw the line between federal and
state authority will therefore remain one of the pressing problems of
the day in such areas as education (including financial support
and desegregation), ecology and pollution abatement, women's and
minorities' rights, welfare, and urban reclamation. Proposals for
the sharing of federal revenues with the states are fertile grounds
for conflict between the federal and state systems, as well.
At the gateway of our discussion, we are met by the ever expand-
ing doctrine of preemption. It is not the purpose of this article to
exhaustively discuss or even to cite the innumerable cases and arti-
cles on the subject of preemption. It is submitted that these are so
hopelessly confused,4 and that the doctrine is so often used in
place of more logically available arguments, that they provide little
guidance for our analysis. We prefer instead to examine various
sources of federal preclusion of state action and to analyze those
usable rules that have been developed in certain preemption cases.
We will pass over other cases, decided as preemption issues, which
more properly could have been faced under other rules, e.g. "undue
burden" on interstate commerce. From this hopefully will come a
more clear, more sound basis for delineating the proper context of
a doctrine of federal preemption in a dynamic federalism. The
possible use of the doctrine of preemption as a tool in the line-
drawing process in relation to current problems can then be dis-
cussed.
It seems to this author that the Supreme Court has not yet faced
the question of the true constitutional place of preemption,5 that is,
the need for coexistence in federalism, and has "by framing the
4. See note 7 and accompanying text, infra.
5. "The standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), are adopted by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion.
We apply the malice test to effectuate the statutory design with respect to pre-
emption." Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966).
"[San Diego Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)], however, does not state
a constitutional principle; it merely rationalizes the problems of coexistence be-
tween federal and state regulatory schemes . . . . The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone." Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963).
1972]
632 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI:630
preemption question in terms of specific congressional intent . . .
manufactured difficulties for itself." The Court has itself recog-
nized the confusion produced by its own choice of preemption
words. '
CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION
One avenue by which the states may be precluded from acting in
some given area is by the express command of the Constitution. The
sole portion of the Constitution that specifically prohibits state ac-
tion is article one, section ten,8 reinforced by the supremacy clause.9
In addition, the thirteenth through fifteenth amendments expressly
prohibit certain acts. The fourteenth amendment has been the tool
for striking down state laws lacking in substantive or procedural
due process, and for requiring equality in areas in which it is be-
coming important that uniformity exists throughout the nation: ed-
ucation (segregation), 10 voter power,"1 criminal justice, 2 welfare
rights,"3 and social and sexual discrimination. 4 Of interest in light
6. Note, Pre-emption As A Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 209 (1959) (footnotes omitted) (on interstate com-
merce cases).
7. In one leading case the Court noted: "This Court, in considering the
validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same
subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; viola-
tion; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an
infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final
analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnotes omitted). See H.P. Welch Co. v.
New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84 (1939).
8. Paragraph one of article one, section ten provides: "No State shall enter
into any treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Re-
prisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin
a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility."
9. U.S. CONST. art.VI.
10. See, e.g., Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Monroe v.
Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Smith v. King, 392
U.S. 309 (1967); Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
14. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
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of a number of "preemption" cases,' 5 and the suggestion we shall
make later, are the provisions of the Constitution which permit
state action subject to the regulation"6 or consent 17 of the Con-
gress.
Together, these provisions establish a clear area of what might
be called "constitutional supremacy." They "preempt" certain state
action or make it subject to Congressional authority by the force of
their own terms.' Although the significance of these clauses can-
not be overstated (as an examination of the fourteenth amendment
cases alone will reveal), they are merely the starting point for the
development of a doctrine of preemption. Obviously preemption
cannot and should not be restricted solely to the cases where the
Constitution specifically proscribes state action or expressly author-
izes Congress to consent to state action.
It is believed that state action will run increasingly afoul of the
authority vested solely in the national government, as expressed in
the specific prohibitions of the Constitution listed above,' 9 partic-
ularly in the federal need for preserving a common citizenry, with
common rights and without discrimination in the basis of sex, race,
or other like characteristics. We shall treat later another area that
might also be termed "constitutional" preemption, in which state
action must be limited by reason of the inherent nature of federalism
in the context of our modem world, in cases not covered by express
constitutional requirements. Where express "constitutional suprem-
acy" must by its nature be relatively static, a doctrine of inherent
369 (1967); Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
15. Compare, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) with In re Rahrer,
140 U.S. 545 (1891); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944) and with Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (relating to elections of senators and representa-
tives); art. I, § 8 (relating to the militia); art. I, § 10 (relating to duties on im-
ports and exports).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (relating to duties on imports, exports and ton-
nage, maintenance of troops, interstate and international compacts, and engaging
in warfare).
18. For a persuasive showing of the argument of "constitutional supremacy" as
applied to federal action in the area of the eighteen year old vote, see Forkosch,
The Inability of Congress to Impinge on State Power to Set Electoral Age Qualifi-
cations, 47 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 83 (1970).
19. See text at notes 8-17, supra.
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constitutional preemption should be openly dynamic. They coin-
cide with each other as one fills the gaps left by the other. How
important some sort of inherent preemption doctrine is to this plan
can be seen from the early cases which hold that the mere express
giving of a power in the Constitution to the federal government does
not itself preempt the field from state action. Complete occupation
of the field by the federal government is required for preemption.2"
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The most common misconception found in the cases21 and the lit-
erature2 2 is that the doctrine of preemption must hinge on the suprem-
acy clause. Hamilton himself seemed to suggest this as a basis in
number thirty-three of The Federalist.23
Hamilton's assertion must be read in light of his earlier statement
that "the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legiti-
mate objects of its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME LAW
of the land. . "24 A law enacted by Congress pursuant to one
of its enumerated powers "could 'not legally be opposed or con-
trolled. ' '25  This is the approach taken by some of the more recent
supremacy clause cases that can be read as establishing an incom-
patibility doctrine.26
However, Hamilton made it clear that the federal powers, al-
though to be supreme when exercised, were intended to exist con-
20. See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Morgan's L. & T.R. &
S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886); The Moses Taylor,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
298 (1851) (admiralty cases); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847) (fiscal
and counterfeiting); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (aliens and naturali-
zation); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (bankruptcy);
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881) (patents and copyrights). But cf.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national defense).
21. See especially, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). For a more recent example, see
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon o1
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
23. Quoted in note 2, supra.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 177 (Mentor Book ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205 (Mentor Book ed. 1961).
26. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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currently with the states in many, if not all, of the enumerated
areas. 7  He recognized that this would create difficulties. Speak-
ing of the concurrent jurisdiction to tax, he remarked that "this
would be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or
defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of
power by one or the other in a manner equally disadvantageous to
both."2  He "hoped and presumed . . .that mutual interest would
dictate a concert in this respect which would avoid any material
inconvenience. '29  Number thirty-four of The Federalist, although
speaking only of taxes, is a classic exposition of the need for con-
current jurisdiction in many of these areas:
Nothing can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power proper to be
lodged in the national government from an estimate of its immediate necessities.
There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may
happen .... 30
The supremacy clause was not intended to be a talisman for the
determination of where the line between exclusive federal or state
control of a field of legislation should be drawn; that was to be a
product of history and the felt needs of the society under a dynamic
or "emerging" constitution. To this degree it should make its con-
tribution to a developing doctrine of preemption. The supremacy
clause was intended, however, as a rule for decision when the con-
current powers came into conflict. Like the other provisions of the
Constitution discussed earlier,"' it was inserted to ensure that certain
specific situations would be dealt with in a certain way. It was
not intended in 1789, and should not now be used, to resolve the
fundamental questions of the partition of political power inherent
in a federal system. Once the location of power was fixed, the
supremacy clause was intended to determine the result of a conflict
of action by two entities within the constitutional federation.
We cannot, therefore, accept the short-cut taken by some,
making preemption depend on the supremacy clause or a doctrine of
statutory construction. 2 But the supremacy cases have done a serv-
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 2- - 2- (Mentor Book ed. 1961).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205 (Mentor Book ed. 1961).
29. Id.
30. THE FEDERALIsT No. 34, at 207 (Mentor Book ed. 1961).
31. See text at notes 8-18, supra.
32. "Continuity is provided by the supremacy clause . . . . This constitu-
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ice to preemption despite their undue reliance on that constitutional
clause. First, they have established three recognized tests appli-
cable to preemption.83  They have also identified federal-state
conflict as being of several kinds with different attitudes being shown
by the Court as to each. 4 But even these definitions and limita-
tions do not seem to this author to adequately phrase the proper
place of the supremacy clause in the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion. It is here suggested that since a mere constitutional grant of
power to Congress does not preempt a field,85 and since "[f]ederal
law is generally interstitial in nature . . . [and] rarely occupies a
legal field completely," 6 the most likely instance in which the fed-
eralist issue will be raised is when the federal government enters a
tional provision forces the Supreme Court to justify any finding of preemption on
the ground that the state activity thus suppressed conflicts with federal labor
policy." Comment, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U. L. REV.
128, 129 (1968) (footnotes omitted). "Preemption is a doctrine of statutory con-
struction." Comment, Constitutional Law: Congressional Preemption Held to Pre-
vent State from Enforcing Stricter Pollution Standards Against Electrical Power
Plant, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1971).
33. (1) Is there a "direct irreconcilable conflict" between the state and federal
legislation? Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1859). (2) Is there
a need for "national uniformity"? Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1851); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961). (3) Does the
statutory scheme show a "clear and manifest purpose" on the part of Congress?
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). These tests are
restated and applied in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963).
34. (1) Where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility federal law clearly controls. Union Bridge Co. v. United States,
204 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1907); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959). (2) Where Congress has chosen to occupy only a limited field and yet
an inference of negation of State action is sought to be drawn-here the Court
will weigh the interests, taking into account the degree of interference and the
clarity with which Congress has spoken. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297(1961). (3) Where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" federal law controls.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). (4) Where "both regulations can be
enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field," state action
is permissible. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, supra, at 142;
Hines v. Davidowitz, supra. The Court in Avocado went on to examine
whether "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or
that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Supra, at 142 (emphasis added).
35. See note 20, supra.
36. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435
(1953). "Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an
ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships
established by the states, altering them or supplanting them only so far as necessary
for the special purpose." See note 20 supra.
636
DYNAMIC FEDERALISM
field (partially or completely) already occupied by a state. The
supremacy clause then becomes the tool by which state and federal
action should be harmonized or by which the federal action can
strike down that of the state. "Supremacy" seems a more accurate
description than general preemption for this purpose. Nor is the
argument impressive that by relying on preemption the Court shifts
the odium for invalidating state law to Congress; in as true a
sense "supremacy" also shifts the onus to Congress when it enters
the field and shows its clear intent. Therefore, the supremacy
clause remains an important criterion for a segment of the preemp-
tion field, and we should not hesitate to refer to it when applica-
ble. 7
PREEMPTION AS A RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
There is a recognized doctrine of dynamic federalism"' which may
be summarized as follows: Although the Constitution confers pow-
ers on the national government, reserves powers to the states, and to
some degree restricts both, such power definition is not the sole
source for determining the proper federal-state relation at any
given time. There are some problems which are of such a nature
and dimension that they cannot adequately be handled by the states.
These should be dealt with by the national government and by it
only, state action being "preempted. 3 9 It is believed that it is in
this area that the doctrine of preemption must and will be de-
veloped.
It may properly be observed that the very first principle of Amer-
ican constitutionalism is federalism. This was and is a growing
and emerging concept, progressing from the earlier confederation
where all national laws operated only on the states (colonies) and
37. Use of the supremacy argument, resting on federal statutes, in addition to
the constitutional theory outlined in notes 8-20 and accompanying text supra,
can be seen in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); and Boynton v.
Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
38. BENNETr, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964); BRAND & WATTS,
FEDERALISM TODAY (1969); ORVIL E. DPEYFOos CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
THE NEW FEDERALISM; A REPORT (1967); Elazar, Cooperation and Conflict;
READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1969); ELAZAR, FEDERALISM AND THE COM-
MUNITY (1968); NATHAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM AND REVENUE SHARING (1969).
39. Note 38 supra. See note 2 and text accompanying notes 24-25, 30 supra;
test number three in note 33 supra.
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national power was delegated by the states, to a fluid recognition
that time would spell out the necessary breadth of powers that
could be exercised adequately only by the federal government.40 It
was this latter recognition on the part of the framers that led to the
Constitution's "necessary and proper" clause.4 ' It is somewhat in-
teresting that no one has emphasized the degree to which Congress
might derive power to preempt from that clause, even though the
standard test for preemption as established in Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp.42 is one of congressional intent: "The question in each
case is what the purpose of Congress was."48
It is submitted that the Supreme Court abdicates its duty as arbiter
of the federal system when it makes the test of preemption the in-
tent of Congress, and no construction should be given to the neces-
sary and proper clause which would diminish even further the Court's
function in allocating power in the federal system. First, it is ques-
tionable whether the action of Congress should be allowed to con-
clusively preclude state action in any given area, unless that preclu-
sion is justified in terms of modern federalism. It is equally doubt-
ful whether Congress should have the sole power to decide to pre-
clude or not preclude. The framers intended the Supreme Court,
not the Congress, to determine where the demands of federalism
should require the line to be drawn:
It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdic-
tions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established under the gen-
eral government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The deci-
sion is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution . . . .44
Undoubtedly part of the reason behind the Court's deference to
Congressional intent is the limited fact-finding ability possessed by
a judicial body. Jurisdiction in many areas intentionally had been
made concurrent by the founders so that neither sovereignty would
be hamstrung as the country developed. Changing demands upon
the national government are best determined through its legislative
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 244-45 (Mentor Book ed. 1961) (James
Madison).
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
42. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
43. Id. at 230.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245-46 (Mentor Book ed. 1961) (James Madi-
son).
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fact-finding process. But the opposite is also true: the needs of the
states are best determined by them. Congress' wishes, as to
where the dividing line will be drawn, should be given great weight,
but the first of the Court's standard Rice tests of preemption only
begs the question: Is the scheme of federal regulation "so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it?"4
More nearly proper is the second test set forth in Rice: whether
the act of Congress "may touch a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."4 6 This approaches
the ultimate question that must be decided by the Court as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law and not as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation.
The real test to be used by federalism's arbiter would seem to be
this: Is this the kind of field in which all activity on the part of the
states should and may be precluded, and to what degree must the
preclusion occur in light of Congressional findings that federal legis-
lation is warranted? Such a test requires the Court first to clearly
identify and weigh the federal and state interests at stake and to de-
termine which should be paramount in light of the current local,
national, and global situation. This decision would then have to be
tested against and tempered by the extent to which Congress has
manifested an intention to control the field (the pervasiveness of the
federal scheme). Inferentially, the Court may be opening the door
to this approach in the third test of Rice: the "object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations im-
posed by it" 47 as determining whether the field should be con-
trolled by the central government. Such an analysis requires the
Court to make the decision it was meant to make: where the line
will be drawn. It does not ignore, however, that the line cannot
be drawn without due respect for the position of Congress on the
matter.
45. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919).
46. 331 U.S. at 230; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (emphasis ad-
ded).
47. 331 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added); Southern Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n., 236
U.S. 439 (1915).
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It is clear that the Court's Rice tests and the one suggested here
are essentially the same. They differ only in the manner in which
they will be applied. The Court tends to direct its tests at the stat-
utory scheme or questions of Congressional intent because in the
past it has tied preemption to the supremacy clause. However, as
was said earlier, the supremacy clause was intended as a rule for
decision when the concurrent powers came into express conflict.48
When the doctrine of preemption is invoked the power will cease to
be concurrent. Cases decided under the Court's approach may
reach the same result in the short run. However, a more sound
theoretical basis may make future cases in newer areas of the law
easier to decide.
The distinction that should be drawn between the supremacy
clause approach of the Court and preemption properly based on
considerations of federalism can be illustrated by comparing Perez v.
Campbell,4" a bankruptcy case, with several cases in the area of for-
eign relations. 50 The state statute in Campbell provided that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy of an automobile accident tort judgment
would have no effect on the obligation of the judgment debtor to re-
pay, at least insofar as enforced by the withholding of driving privi-
leges. The issue properly to be decided was whether such a stat-
ute "opposed or controlled"'" section seventeen of the Bankruptcy
Act.52 The purposes of the Bankruptcy Act are twofold: to pro-
vide debtors with a new lease on their economic lives and to divide
the debtor's assets equitably amongst his creditors."3 The state
statute served to defeat both of these objectives54 and hence was
invalid by virtue of the supremacy clause. This decision means only
that a state cannot validly enact this kind of statute regarding judg-
ment creditors and driver financial responsibility. The case spoke
in terms of preemption, and thereby seemed to go well beyond what
48. See text at note 31 supra.
49. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
50. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see text at notes 58-75, intra.
51. Supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
53. Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447 (1943); Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
54. See 2 MEMPHiS L. REv. 191 (1972).
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the Court needed to decide. A holding of preemption would mean
that a state could not pass any law regarding judgment creditors
and/or financial responsibility, a question the Court expressly ruled
was not before it for decision.
Similarly, criticism can be levelled at the use of "preemption" in
the interstate commerce and labor cases, where so much of the law
of preemption has been developed. By using "preemption," with its
implication that the whole field is federally appropriated, rather
than "undue burden," which implies joint power while emphasizing
supremacy of federal authority, preclusion of state action may have
been forced when in fact some form (but not that of the statute
under review) might be good federalism. 55 This author believes
that much of the confusion in the economic regulation cases, from
Campbell v. Hussey 6 to the Avocado case,5 7 could have been
avoided if conflict rather than preemption language had been used.
Cases in the field of foreign affairs and national security seem to
show an application of the doctrine of preemption closer to that
for which we argue. This may be seen from the Hines,5" Nelson59
and Zschernig6 ° cases.
Hines v. Davidowitz involved the 1939 Pennsylvania Registration
Act. That statute required aliens over seventeen to register yearly,
55. Interstate Commerce: Compare "undue burden," Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958), with "preclusion," in
Public Utilities Commission v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Comm'n., 372 U.S. 84 (1963); Maurer v. Hamilton,
309 U.S. 598 (1940); and Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
Labor: See particularly Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 541 (1945);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383, 394 (1951); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953);
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959); Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 179 (1967). See Comment, Federal Pre-emption in Labor Rela-
tions, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 128 (1968).
The importance of this shift to "pre-emption" can be seen from the fact that
there were over fifty interstate commerce and labor "pre-emption" cases in the
district and circuit courts in 1970-71.
56. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
57. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra note 34.
58. Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 34.
59. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 20.
60. Zschernig v. Miller, supra note 50.
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provide prescribed information, pay a one dollar fee, carry an iden-
tification card, and exhibit the card on demand of police and other
officials. It provided for fine and imprisonment for violation. The
federal 1940 Alien Registration Act required registration of persons
over thirteen, fingerprinting, detailed information, secrecy of federal
files except as provided by the Attorney General, and did not require
the carrying or exhibition of a registration card. Only willful failure
to register was criminal. The Court went far toward considering the
field of foreign affairs within federalism as automatically one of na-
tional supremacy, though it buttressed its argument by saying that
at least Congress could complete the preemption and had done so
here:
That the supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs,
including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by
the Constitution, was pointed out by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has
since been given continuous recognition by this Court .... 61
[]]he power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is
not an equal and continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation, but
that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law. .... 62
The nature of the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be attained,
and the character of the obligations imposed by the law, are all important in con-
sidering ... . whether supreme federal enactments preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject .... 63
Whether or not registration of aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution per-
mits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress
might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable. 6 4
A case properly suited for application of the true preemption
doctrine was Pennsylvania v. Nelson.65 Nelson, an admitted leader
of the Communist Party in Pennsylvania, had been convicted of vio-
lation of that state's sedition act. His appeal to the Supreme Court
was squarely on the federalism question: Is the area of sedition a
realm in which the federal government should have control exclu-
sive of the states?66 But the Court backed off the path charted in
Hines and ended with a weak decision.67 Mr. Justice Warren, writ-
61. 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1940).
62. Id. at 68.
63. Id. at 70.
64. Id. at 73.
65. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
66. Brief for Respondent, at 9, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
67. It is not to be denied that the Court was influenced by the strong states'
rights forces, the opposition of the Attorney General, and even the willingness of
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ing for the Court, reversed the conviction on the ground that the
Smith Act "superseded" Pennsylvania law. He first summarized the
provisions of the three major federal acts relating to subversion:
the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist
Control Act of 1954. Applying the "pervasive character" test, he
concluded that these statutes "evince a congressional plan which
makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for the
States to supplement it."68
Mr. Justice Warren then went on to note that Communist activi-
ties were regarded as part of a world conspiracy, and that federal in-
terest in sedition activities was part of the national government's
program to strengthen the nation's defenses against external aggres-
sion: the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency had been given responsibility for intelligence concern-
ing Communist seditious activities. He noted that the Constitution
required the national government to "provide for the common de-
fense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an inde-
pendent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form
of government."6 9 Such an analysis might suggest that the opinion
was headed for the constitutional federalism position, but Warren
returned to the supremacy theme to conclude that since Congress
had chosen to act decisively to carry out these requirements on a
national scale, the states were thereby precluded from exercising any
concurrent power.
Justice Warren's third rationale was another somewhat strained
attempt to invoke the supremacy clause. Statements by President
Roosevelt and J. Edgar Hoover were cited to demonstrate that the
federal government had urged the states not to interfere with fed-
eral action in this area. An extensive discussion'of the dangers
to civil liberties to be found in state sedition statutes and the lack of
successful prosecutions for sedition by local or state governments was
offered supposedly to show a potential conflict with the federal pro-
gram. These arguments under the supremacy clause are weak be-
Congress to sanction state anti-subversive statutes. See text at note 70 infra;
Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the Land,
41 MINN. L. REv. 287, 328 (1957). Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960);
H.R. No. 3, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
68. Supra note 65, at 504.
69. Supra note 65, at 505.
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cause they show not "opposition or conflict" with a federal law;
rather they show possible inconvenience to federal enforcement action
and poor draftsmanship on the part of the states (which are hardly
relevant to a determination of whether the states may act at all).
Primary emphasis upon the wishes of Congress made the Nelson
decision open to attack on several grounds and diminishes its value
as a preemption case. For example, the "pervasive scheme" of Con-
gress' argument was countered by Mr. Justice Reed for the dissent
on the grounds that Congress was aware of the plethora of state
anti-subversion statutes. The Justice Department's brief specifically
stated that there was no actual conflict present in two systems of reg-
ulation: "The administration of the various state laws has not...
embarrassed, or impeded the enforcement of the Smith Act."17
Since preemption is a function of federalism, it is submitted that
the case should have been decided on federal constitutional grounds.
A proper analysis might go as follows: Communism is the state poli-
tics of a major world power and the problem of subversion is inter-
nationally a very sensitive area. Foreign affairs is the province
only of the nation, not the states, as only the federal government
can deal with foreign nations. Only Congress can raise and support
the army necessary to fulfill the federal government's constitutional
duty to provide for the common defense. That defense can have two
fronts, combatting external, overt aggression, and preventing take-
over from within. The Constitution requires the federal government
to protect the states against invasion and domestic violence and to
guarantee them a republican form of government. 71  "Subver-
sion" is thus so closely tied to the most crucial and clear national
powers that the field is, by its nature, preempted from the states.
Practically speaking as well, the federal government is better suited
to deal with Communist activity with its global or national orienta-
tion.
The result of the Court's approach and that which we suggest
may well be the same in the Nelson case. However, the approach set
forth here allows the Court to develop rules for deciding the ques-
tions of power inherent in a federal system confronting a changing
70. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, at 30, Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
71. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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world. 71 It is probable that the ultimate goal should be federal
power, perhaps with state cooperation allowed and encouraged
through consent given by Congress. 3
Zschernig v. Miller 74 has been little noted by the writers but
seems to rectify many of the ambiguities left by Nelson. In Zscher-
nig there was no federal statute involved and the only relevant fed-
eral treaty had been construed by the Court as not applicable to
the type of personal property in question. Nevertheless, the Court
struck down an Oregon statute limiting inheritance of personal prop-
erty by non-resident aliens to those from countries that grant recipro-
cal rights to United States citizens "without confiscation, in whole or
in part." The Court pointed out that under such state statutes pro-
bate courts:
have launched inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in a particular
foreign nation-whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the
so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of gov-
ernment officials, whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other
representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether there is
in the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of
confiscation. 7 5
According to the Court, this amounted to "an intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and to Congress." The clear result of this case is that
72. Mr. Justice Warren carefully described what Nelson did not affect: "The
decision in this case does not affect the right of States to enforce their sedition laws
at times when the Federal Government has not occupied the field and is not pro-
tecting the entire country, from seditious conduct. . . . Nor does it limit the
jurisdiction of the States where the Constitution and Congress have specifically
given them concurrent jurisdiction, as was done under the Eighteenth Amendment
and the Volstead Act. . . . Neither does it limit the right of the State to pro-
tect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted violence . . . (nior does it
prevent the State from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a federal...
and a state offense .... ." Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 65, at 500. Per-
haps it is preoccupation with these extraneous problems that inhibits the Court
from utilizing a doctrine of preemption founded squarely on federalism. There
should be no such reticence. Pre-emption problems will rarely arise in the absence
of some federal legislation. See note 36 and accompanying text, supra; but see text
at note 74, infra. Pre-emption as it has been developed here is not called into play
in cases of "constitutional pre-emption" which includes cases of explicit concurrent
jurisdiction. See text at notes 8-20, supra. And Justice Warren's last concern ig-
nores what is to be pre-empted: state control of sedition, not bombing or assassi-
nation.
73. See text at notes 54-58, supra.
74. Supra note 50.
75. Supra note 50, at 433-34. For a recent case on a similar problem, see
Shames v. Nebraska, appeal docketed, No. 70-143, May 3, 1971.
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preemption is not just a question of Congressional intent; rather it
is a function of the proper recognition of where certain subjects are
placed in the federal system.
We are suggesting here that this same approach should be em-
ployed on many subjects, in addition to foreign affairs, which in the
dynamics of today must be dealt with by the federal government if
they are to be handled adequately.
CONSENT AND FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION
One of the concerns expressed by Chief Justice Warren in the
Nelson case was that methods of cooperation between the federal and
state governments should be preserved. That is certainly a proper
component of federalism, but the way to provide it is not by illogi-
cal bending of the concept of preemption. Rather, even in pre-
empted areas, the rule that the Congress can consent to state action
furnishes the logical way out. The Constitution expressly recognizes
such use of consent in article one, section ten: "No State shall,
without the consent of Congress . . .enter into any agreement or
compact with another State, or with a foreign power ... ."" There
are numerous Supreme Court cases recognizing cooperation through
Congressional consent in what have been treated as preemptable
areas. 77  A typical Congressional declaration is found in section
10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 78  The Court has recognized some
of the advantages to such cooperation: state aid where federal staffs
are inadequate, recognition of differences in different localities and
state provided flexibility, allowance of special state concerns, flexi-
bility of penalties provided, and choice between legislative and ad-
76. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustment, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925); Dunbar, Interstate Com-
pacts and Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L. REV. 753 (1950).
77. See Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964); Retail
Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); West Virginia
ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949);
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936);
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
78. Other examples include the Wilson Act of 1890, applied by In re Rahrer,
140 U.S. 545 (1891); The Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 applied in Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); The McCarran Act of
1945 (15 U.S.C. § 1011) applied in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408 (1946).
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ministraitive patterns.79 But, a warning is essential. The way out is
not by a general abnegation of federal power, or a wholesale giv-
ing of consent to states' rights proponents as was attempted by some
Congressmen immediately following the Nelson decision. The his-
tory of these attempts and the folly of the approach is well treated
elsewhere . 0  It is not surprising that the author there, as here,
found that Nelson could be overturned by Congress "unless the
Supreme Court should show some new-found disposition to treat
federal power over sedition as constitutionally exclusive."'"
SOME AREAS OF LIKELY APPLICATION
At the beginning of this article we suggested a considerable list
of proper areas for applying "federalism preemption" as it has been
advocated herein. We are now beginning to see many of these prob-
lems appearing in the courts (with mixed success): sex-based
state classifications constitutionally preempted, 2 nuclear pollution
standards,"3 other air and noise pollution issues, 84 automobile safe-
ty,85 control of contents of mail,86 revenue sharing,87 and many
79. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306
U.S. 79 (1939); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Mermin, Cooperative
Federalism Again, 57 YALE L.J. 1, 201 (1947).
80. Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the
Land, 41 MINN. L. REV. 287, 327 (1957).
81. Id. at 332.
82. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See Note, Are Sex-based Classifica-
tions Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 481 (1971); Note, A Woman's
Place: Diminishing Justifications for Sex Discrimination in Employment, 42 S. CAL.
L. REV. 183 (1969).
83. See Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co., appeal docketed, No. 71-650,
Nov. 12, 1971; Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D.
Minn. 1970); Note, The Legal Setting of Nuclear Powerplant Siting Decisions,
57 CoRNELL L. REV. 80 (1971); Comment, 55 MINN. L. REV., supra note 32.
84. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, appeal docketed, No. 71-422, Sept.
28, 1971; Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal.
1970); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967); Note, Federal vs. State Control of Aeronautical Noise Pollution, 5
SUFF. L. REV. 1093 (1971); Rathwell, Air Pollution, Pre-emption, Local Problems
and the Constitution-Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 97 (1968).
85. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969). See
48 TEX. L. REV. 1394 (1970).
86. See Miller v. California, probable jurisdiction noted, No. 70-73, March 29,
1971, argued before the Court and now awaiting decision.
87. See P-H FED. TAXES, Report Bulletin No. 3, 60,021. See also Symposium
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others. Federal control and support of education and welfare be-
comes more imminent daily as the local real property taxes are nulli-
fied as a means of support, as bussing and desegregation are faced,
and as welfare rights are broadened and state welfare acts are in-
validated. 8
CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the Court has taken the wrong tack, al-
though in part considering proper factors, in its development of a
doctrine of preemption. This has resulted in an undesirable confu-
sion in the law that will impede the proper determination of future
cases in more dynamic federalism.
The first line of inquiry should be the principles of what we
have called "constitutional preemption." If they are not disposi-
tive of the question, some cases can be decided on the basis of the
supremacy clause. Only when these methods fail, and after the area
of the law in question has evolved to the point where both the Con-
gress and the Court have sufficient experience to make a judgment
regarding national needs, should a preemption doctrine be brought
into play. The most effective theory in an adequate preemption
doctrine is dynamic federalism-a developing concept of when the
needs of society can best or only be met by federal intervention.
The ultimate obligation for deciding this question is on the Court; it
ought not to abrogate its power to Congress. Once the line is drawn
by the Court, however, the responsibility shifts to Congress to occupy
the field set aside for it and to provide adequately for the fulfillment
of the nation's goals. It has authority to use cooperation from the
states, the decision when to do so belonging to itself. A proper
doctrine of preemption has the advantage not only of resolving par-
ticular cases, but also of establishing the allocation of responsibility
within our federal system.
on Federal Fiscal Support for State and Local Governments, 24 NAT. TAX. J. 131
(1971).
88. See, e.g., Swam v. Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 47 (1971); Johnson v.
New York Education Dep't, 319 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
2127 (1971); Villa v. Hall, - Cal. -, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460, 490 P.2d 1148 (1971);
Serrano v. Priest, - Cal.-, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
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